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The role for simulations in theory construction for the social sciences: Case 
studies concerning Divergent Modes of Religiosity 
Harvey Whitehouse, Ken Kahn, Michael E. Hochberg, and Joanna J. Bryson  
Abstract 
Religion is, at the very least, a highly complex social phenomenon.  The theories we use to understand religion – 
and the social sciences more generally – are often so complex that even experts in the field may not be able to 
see all their consequences. Social simulations can help us understand and communicate the consequences of a 
theory, provided we can describe the theory sufficiently precisely and comprehensively to run it on a computer. 
In this article we demonstrate the benefits of simulating the predictions of a well-known theory in the Cognitive 
Science of Religion, the theory of Divergent Modes of Religiosity. Many of these predictions have already been 
tested against contemporary and longitudinal evidence, using the methods of both qualitative case study and 
large-scale survey, and some of the mechanisms responsible for the patterns observed have been investigated by 
means of controlled experiments. Nevertheless, in simulating the patterns of religious transmission and 
transformation predicted by the modes theory we discovered numerous aspects that were underspecified, 
generating new hypotheses for investigation in future empirical research. This back-and-forth between 
simulation and theory testing has the potential to accelerate progress in the scientific study of religion. 
Introduction:  Simulation as a Scientific Tool for the Study of Religion 
Since its introduction to the social sciences by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), social 
simulation has been widely viewed as a powerful tool with obvious applicability to the full 
range of social sciences, including the study of religion. Nevertheless the history of social 
simulation has been variable. There have been outstanding recent examples of social science 
informed by simulations such as the Powell et al. (2009) anthropological account of the 
Paleolithic transition, or the work done by Laver (2005) to test the fit between theories of 
political party policy making and real party behavior. Yet the vast majority of social 
simulation papers languish in specialist conferences and journals. While such venues may 
help advance the technological state of the art for simulation, the substance-area contributions 
of these works are often overlooked. Indeed given review processes that take place outside of 
the mainstream for their substance areas, in the worst case the substantial social science 
contributions of these papers may not even be fully tested. This process may account for the 
suspicion with which some academics view work done in social simulation. 
All new research methodologies, whether quantitative or qualitative, deservedly meet 
scrutiny before they are considered to have proved their utility. In this article we both argue 
and demonstrate that social simulation has by now proved its utility at least in some contexts. 
We hope also to help make those contexts more apparent — not only to those who do not yet 
include social simulation as part of their research tool set, but also to those modelers who 
have had difficulty publishing in or otherwise engaging with the mainstream literature of 
their chosen application field. 
Although there has been some debate and discussion about the exact role of simulation in not 
only the study of religion but science more generally, there is increasing consensus that a 
simulation simply is a theory (Bryson et al., 2007; Kokko, 2007). Like any other theory, a 
simulation must be tested against data derived from observations of the world, pertaining to 
the target system that the theory seeks to explain. What makes simulation special as a 
methodology is that, in order to be simulated, a theory must be specified so completely that 
its consequences can be demonstrated by executing it on a computer.  This allows the 
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discovery of emergent outcomes not originally anticipated, which may serve as additional 
evidence for or against the theory. 
A critical aspect of the scientific process is that theories can change. They may be extended, 
generalized, or specified to create more or better explanations. Science itself can be viewed as 
an evolutionary process, where peer review and other forms of expert opinion (e.g. choices 
made for teaching curricula or studies to replicate) continually narrow the field of available 
theories by selecting between them, but then subsequently broaden the field by varying the 
surviving theories – applying a variety of enhancements to these theories in order to increase 
their validity or predictive value. Simulation can perform several key roles in this process. 
Simulations not only allow better understanding of theories, they allow theories to be 
communicated with unprecedented precision as the actual code of the simulation can be 
transmitted from researcher to researcher over the Internet.  
The simulation process therefore holds promise to improve and accelerate the process of the 
scientific understanding of religion.  But it also carries with it risks. Theories represented as 
computer simulations might become so complex that they could not be truly understood by 
any one mind. This could result in a situation where our ability to predict religious behavior 
could continue to improve, but without an associated increase in individual-human 
understanding. Besides potentially decreasing the pleasure or accessibility of scientific 
reasoning, such circumstances might also result in a reduction of scientific innovation where 
that innovation is based on human insight. On the other hand, many doubt that phenomena so 
complex as religion could ever be represented in the crude digital, quantitative ways that 
computational approaches typify. 
In this article we attempt to address both of these concerns by demonstrating the value of 
simulation to theory construction.  We detail progress we have made in extending the 
development of a well-known and well-established theory in the Cognitive Science of 
Religion, the Divergent Modes of Religiosity theory, via the use of two different social 
simulations. We begin with a recapitulation of the Modes theory itself, and of a case study of 
a religious system that inspired it, the birth and death of religious splinter groups in the 
Kivung. We then present qualitative descriptions of two models, the full details of which 
(including code) can be found in an electronic supplement to this article. The first simulation 
replicates the doctrinal-imagistic oscillations seen in the Kivung, while the second, more 
abstract simulation looks at processes underlying cycles in religious conservatism and 
ritualism more generally. Following from these we enumerate changes we have made to the 
Modes theory as a result of these simulations, before concluding with a brief discussion of the 
general value of simulation in the religious context. 
Modes of Religiosity 
The theory of ‘Divergent Modes of Religiosity’ (hereafter DMR) makes a series of testable 
predictions about the effects of ritual frequency and arousal on group size, structure, and 
patterns of transformation in a religion over time (Whitehouse 1995, 2000, 2004). The theory 
seeks to explain the striking differences we see between two broadly contrasting patterns of 
religious organization and transmission: the doctrinal mode exemplified by the many 
varieties of world religions embracing vast followings and promulgating a body of 
standardized teachings; and the imagistic mode uniting much smaller communities cultivating 
somewhat personal and esoteric revelations. The doctrinal mode is relatively recent, with 
origins around 8,000 years ago associated with agriculture and urbanization.  The imagistic 
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mode is older.  It currently often takes the form of localized traditions within a larger 
doctrinal system but it may still occur independently, as it does in many of the world’s 
remaining small-scale stateless societies.  
 
The doctrinal mode entails frequently repeated teachings and rituals. Much of the religious 
knowledge is codified in language and transmitted primarily via recognized leaders and 
authoritative texts. High-frequency ritual performances allow complex networks of ideas to 
be transmitted and stored in semantic memory. At the same time, routinization tends to 
suppress certain kinds of creative thinking about the meanings of the rituals. For both 
reasons, routinization is probably a necessary condition for the establishment of religious 
orthodoxies. The emphasis on verbal transmission facilitates highly efficient and rapid 
spread, through processes of evangelism and missionization. The emphasis on oratory and 
learning also facilitates the emergence of venerable leaders and teachers: gurus, prophets, and 
priests. These features taken together favor the emergence of centralized ecclesiastic 
hierarchies, which exert influence over the content and organization of authoritative religious 
knowledge.  
 
By contrast, the imagistic mode of religiosity is based on infrequent, dysphoric rituals – for 
instance, the traumatic ordeals of initiation cults, millenarian sects, vision quests, and so on – 
typically involving extreme forms of deprivation, bodily mutilation and flagellation, or 
participation in shocking acts. Such practices trigger enduring and vivid episodic memories 
for ritual ordeals, encouraging long-term rumination on the mystical significance of the acts 
and artefacts involved. Imagistic practices are much harder to spread than doctrinal traditions. 
A major reason for this is that the religious knowledge is created through collective 
participation in costly rituals rather than being summed up in speech or text. Traumatic rituals 
create strong bonds among those who experience them together, establishing in people’s 
episodic memories exactly who was present when a particular cycle of rituals took place. This 
tends to generate localized cults based on direct transmission through following by example, 
and so we never find the same kind of scale, uniformity, centralization, or hierarchical 
structure that typifies the doctrinal mode. 
 
The DMR theory has been used to explain a number of long-standing puzzles in the study of 
religion. For instance, historians and biologists have used this theory to explain why 
routinized religions sometimes break up into splinter-groups or sects and why reformations 
occur (Gragg 2004; Hinde 2005; Pyysiainen 2004). Archaeologists have used the theory to 
account for the great transition from small-scale Neolithic societies to the vast and complex 
civilizations of the Near East, Mediterranean, and North Africa (Mithen 2004, Johnson 2004, 
Whitehouse and Hodder 2010). The modes theory has now been tested against over a 
hundred case studies based on ethnography (papers in Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2004, 2007), 
history, classics, and archaeology (papers in Whitehouse and Martin 2004, Martin and 
Whitehouse 2005, Pachis and Martin 2009), and the cognitive sciences (papers in Whitehouse 
and McCauley 2005, McCauley and Whitehouse 2005). Some of the evidence needed to test 
the modes theory was not available from established scholarship and so a number of new 
field research projects have been undertaken, targeting data collection towards areas where 
evidential needs of the theory were especially great (Barrett 2005, Ketola 2005, Xygalatas 
2007). To obviate potential problems of researcher and selection bias, additional strategies 
have been adopted, including experimental research (Richert, Whitehouse, and Stewart 
2005), and the construction of large-scale comparative datasets coding selected features of 
ethnographic descriptions of hundreds of rituals from a large sample of religious traditions 
(Atkinson and Whitehouse 2010). 
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Case study: mainstream Kivung movement and splinter groups 
The DMR theory was first applied to a religious tradition in East New Britain Province, 
Papua New Guinea known as the Kivung (Whitehouse 1995). In Tok Pisin (the lingua franca 
of PNG), the word ‘Kivung’ means ‘a meeting’ or ‘to meet’ but for several ethnic groups in 
New Britain it also designates a large religious movement exemplifying all the main features 
of the Doctrinal Mode of Religiosity. Established in the early 1960s and spreading to 
encompass scores of villages in some of the more remote regions of the island, the movement 
has a centralized leadership, based at the coastal settlement of Malmal, from which regular 
patrols to outlying villages are sent: bringing news, collecting taxes, and policing the 
orthodoxy. Each Kivung village has its designated orators, trained at Malmal, charged with 
the responsibility of preaching a standard body of doctrines and overseeing a wide range of 
authorized rituals. At the heart of Kivung teachings is the idea that the ancestors of followers 
will one day return from the dead, bringing with them all the wonders of Western technology. 
It is said that the returning ancestors will take the physical appearance of white men and 
women, describing themselves as British or American financial investors and scientists. They 
will establish factories and shops where all the goods on display will be freely available to 
members of the Kivung. After this era of plenty, known as 'Taim Bilong Kampani’ (the period 
of the companies), there will be a great Day of Judgment, presided over by God and the 
ancestors. Those who use their riches wisely will be saved but those who are greedy and 
debauched will be cast into Hell. The saved will then enjoy eternal Paradise on earth, known 
as Taim Bilong Gavman (period of the government) during which there will be no aging, no 
illness, no hunger, no childbirth, and no pain.  
In order to persuade the ancestors to return from the dead and fulfill this eschatology, Kivung 
followers are required to perform a great variety of rituals and to obey various religious laws. 
Kivung rituals fall into four main categories: temple offerings, spiritual cleansing, 
sermonizing, and garden/cemetery rites. There are three categories of temple in each Kivung 
village: a cemetery temple, a temple dedicated to one of the movement’s spiritual leaders 
(now deceased), and family temples. All have basically the same function – providing a 
suitable setting to lay out offerings to the ancestors of food, water and (if available) money. 
Each village has only one cemetery temple where offerings are presented twice a week. After 
the tables are laden, one man described as a ‘witness’ remains behind in the temple sitting on 
a rough bench in the corner listening for signs that the ancestors are present (such as a 
creaking door, or sounds of chewing or drinking). Sometimes the food is found to have been 
disturbed (for instance a morsel mysteriously removed) also taken as evidence of ancestral 
presence. At an appointed time, the witness emerges into the daylight to find the whole 
village assembled, eager to learn what has been seen or heard within the temple. The witness 
whispers into the ear of an orator who solemnly conveys the news. If evidence of ancestral 
presence is lacking this is a cause for concern, suggesting that somebody in the community 
has offended the dead. 
Kivung ancestors are quite easily offended. The most common affront is to break one of the 
ten sacred laws, based loosely on the Decalogue of the Old Testament (as taught originally by 
Catholic missionaries in the region). Although invisible, the ancestors are thought to be 
present at any given time and take a keen interest in people’s comings and goings. They are 
pleased when people obey the ten laws and offended by sinful behavior. Only when the living 
have eliminated sin will the ancestors return from the dead. The observations of the witness 
in the cemetery temple provide a way of gauging levels of sinfulness and the offerings when 
received are thought to strengthen the resolve of the ancestors to return. The sins of 
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individuals, families, and whole communities are regularly absolved through special rituals 
designed to restore harmonious relations with the ancestors. 
Other regular communal activities that take place in the Kivung are special tasks and rituals 
associated with the village cemetery (where the dead are said to be ‘planted’ rather than 
‘buried’) and communal gardens. An important site in any Kivung village is the ‘Paradise 
Garden’, representing the environment of Adam and Eve prior to the original sin. In Kivung 
accounts of the fall, offense was caused not by the eating of forbidden fruit but by Eve 
climbing a betel palm in which Adam had implanted a sharpened stone. As Eve slithered 
down she cut herself between her legs producing a strong flow of blood, the origin of her 
childbearing capacities (and those of her female descendants). For this reason Kivung 
followers distinguish themselves from most other New Guinea peoples by abstaining from 
the chewing of betel nut. They say that the red substance spat out by chewers is like 
menstrual blood, regarded as a dangerous pollutant in many indigenous cultures of PNG. One 
of the laws of the Kivung is that menstruating women cannot help to prepare offerings for the 
ancestors. 
Such beliefs and practices are common to all Kivung villages, expressed regularly in public 
acts and pronouncements. Routinized transmission of Kivung beliefs and practices produces a 
high level of standardization of the mainstream orthodoxy, with even minor innovations and 
infractions being easy to identify and collectively policed. As noted above, in terms of DMR 
theory the mainstream Kivung has all the features of the ‘doctrinal mode’ (Whitehouse 1992, 
1995, 2000). The resulting shared tradition comprises a shared meaning system roughly 
depicted in Figure 1 as a ‘semantic network’ (Carley and Kaufer 1993) of related ideas. 
Semantic networks are an analytic tool useful for evaluating theories like the DMR. The 
nodes in Figure 1 represent publicly transmitted concepts, framed in everyday discourse, in 
ritual and in the speeches of Kivung leaders and orators. The links between nodes represent 
especially close thematic or implicational associations, such that discourse pertaining to any 
given node has a high probability of referring also to those nodes to which it is directly 
linked. The strength of links between nodes, as represented here, is a function of how directly 
they are linked. In this simple network some nodes (e.g. God) are directly linked to most of 
the others but a few are more distantly connected and so more weakly linked to most other 
nodes (e.g. the ban on betel chewing is directly linked to only two other nodes). This also 
means that God is a more central node in the network than certain others, such as the ban on 
betel chewing. 
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Figure 1: Mapping the mainstream meaning system 
However exotic the Kivung may seem to Western observers, the mainstream semantic 
network is grounded in at least four implicit beliefs that are shared by all human populations 
(Boyer 2001; Barrett 2004). These implicit beliefs or ‘intuitive anchor points’ are depicted as 
black rectangles in the four corners of Figure 1. The intuitive anchors in our model are 
common to all religious traditions: (1) mind-body dualism delivers the ubiquitous intuition 
that higher level cognitive capacities such as beliefs, memories and desires can occur outside 
bodies e.g. in incorporeal beings such as ghosts, ancestors, and gods (Bloom 2004); (2) 
promiscuous teleology supports the recurrent belief that features of the natural world were 
designed with a purpose e.g. as proposed by creation myths (Kelemen and DiYanni 2005); (3) 
hazard precaution helps to explain the obligatory character of ritual, accounting also for the 
exaggerated concern in many rituals with symmetry and exactness, threshold and entrance, 
redundant repetition, etc. (Boyer and Lienard 2006); (4) immanent justice is the ubiquitous 
intuition that bad deeds lead to punishment and prosocial behavior leads to rewards (Callen, 
Ellard and Nicol 2006).  As is typical of religions generally, most Kivung teachings and 
practices are directly rooted in one or more of these anchoring implicit beliefs. The more 
distantly a belief is connected to an anchor point the more mnemonic support and cultural 
scaffolding it requires to be preserved intact, for instance in the form of regular repetition in 
sermons or sacred texts. In the absence of such pedagogic aids religious beliefs over time 
tend to be converted into more intuitive expressions, a process that has been described as the 
Cognitive Optimum Effect (Whitehouse 2004). Our model incorporates four anchor points; a 
more complete model would require several more (Whitehouse 2008). 
The mainstream orthodoxy of the Kivung depicted in Figure 1 is occasionally eclipsed by 
small splinter groups comprising no more than a few villages at most, who break away 
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temporarily from the larger religious movement claiming that they have a new plan for 
bringing the ancestors back from the dead. Outbursts of this kind occur in most Kivung 
villages roughly every five years. Each time a splinter group occurs, its prophesies fail and 
followers typically return to the fold, resuming their daily rounds of mainstream Kivung 
rituals more or less as if nothing had happened. Splinter groups are usually inspired by some 
extraordinary event, interpreted as a sign that the ancestors are ready to return. It is quite 
common for individuals to claim to have witnessed such a sign but generally the consensus is 
skeptical. When motivation levels are high among mainstream followers, skepticism is 
strong. But after years of unremitting commitment to routinized practices, people grow weary 
and impatient,
1
 becoming more credulous of claims that now, at last, the longed-for miracle is 
due. Splinter group activities invariably whip up high levels of excitement, in stark contrast to 
the dullness of everyday ritual life. Once hopes are some followers defect. But a more 
common pattern is for followers to return to the mainstream movement with renewed vigor 
and conviction, listing any number of rationalizations for the failure of prophesy. In effect, 
splinter groups typically rejuvenate commitment to Kivung orthodoxy. Similar patterns have 
been observed in millenarian movements and ‘activist’ religions more generally (Whitehouse 
2000). Splinter groups predicting impossible events such as the return of a messiah or of the 
ancestors tend not to endure, whereas those with less falsifiable prophesies may turn into 
more lasting mainstream traditions in their own right (Stark and Bainbridge 1979). But either 
way, group morale following a splintering event tends to be raised considerably.  
Figure 2 shows the semantic network generated by one instance of a splinter group 
documented during a two-year period of fieldwork in the late 1980s (Whitehouse 1995). The 
trigger for this particular splintering event was the alleged possession of a young man, 
Tanotka, by a local ancestor. During his spirit possession, Tanotka uttered various cryptic 
statements such as ‘I am a post’. This was interpreted as a reference to the construction of 
traditional round houses, where the rafters of the roof converge upon a central post. For 
many, this meant that the possessing ancestor (post) would support the community (multiple 
rafters) in its efforts to be reunited with the village government. As this idea gained currency 
a series of new rituals were invented, involving the symbolism of circles and posts (for 
instance dancing in a circle or creating rings of human bodies with Tanotka in the center). 
Other novel ideas rapidly caught on. For instance, it was suggested that people should discard 
all Western style clothes such as shorts and T-shirts and go virtually naked as their ancestors 
had once done. Since the sudden appearance of naked bodies prompted widespread erotic 
excitement the leaders of the splinter group decided to organize a mass marriage to pair off 
those at greatest risk of temptation to fornicate (especially young bachelors). Witnesses in the 
temples who had previously only heard noises attributable to the visiting spirits now claimed 
to be hearing fully articulated statements from the ancestors which became known as ‘reports’ 
(reminiscent of the authority of government reports). Great feasts were held to celebrate the 
imminent return of the ancestors. New teachings became widely accepted, for instance that 
when the ancestors returned the living would peel away their black skins to reveal a fresh 
white skin underneath, free of blemishes and sores. The forest would be flattened and a 
concrete ‘paradise’ of high-rise buildings would replace it. The dominant ethnic group in the 
region, the Tolai (who had long ridiculed the Kivung), would receive a share of the riches 
brought by the ancestors. But this would be their undoing, because they would squander their 
wealth and be cast into Hell. In preparation for these much-desired events, splinter group 
members constructed a traditional round house where they held nightly vigils to await the 
returning ancestors. Feasting continued until all local food stocks had been depleted but there 
                                                 
1
  This impatience has been described as the ‘tedium effect’ (Whitehouse 2004) 
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was no sign of the returning ancestors. A government patrol ordered everyone back to their 
homes and gardens. Most people claimed that the Devil had blocked them but next time they 
would succeed.  
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Figure 2: The meaning system of a Kivung splinter group 
The splinter group lasted only a matter of months. During this period it produced a novel 
belief system consisting primarily of new nodes, which we depict in Figure 2 with red circles. 
This system overlaps the core elements of the mainstream movement, depicted with black 
circles in Figure 2. At its height this short-lived semantic network gained general acceptance 
in two villages but never spread more widely than that. In terms of DMR theory, the splinter 
group exemplifies the ‘imagistic mode’ (Whitehouse 1995, 2000). A diagnostic feature of this 
shift from the doctrinal to the imagistic is the appearance of low-frequency, highly-arousing 
rituals. 
Model 1: Simulating doctrinal-imagistic oscillations in the Kivung 
For the purpose of modeling the oscillation between a doctrinal mainstream movement and 
an imagistic splinter group in the Kivung, we broke the process into two parts: (1) a tool kit 
consisting of a set of high-level domain-specific behaviors, and (2) specific Kivung models 
built from the tool kit by composing and parameterizing behaviors (Kahn and Noble 2010). 
Dividing the simulation task in this way facilitates the construction of multiple related 
models. It also facilitates understanding, because it clarifies which aspects of a model are 
unique to the specific target system, and which are general to the theory under which the 
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model is constructed. Finally, the tool kit permits researchers lacking the technical expertise 
to build computer models from scratch to still modify and refine models by recombining or 
reparametrizing established theoretical components by using the abstractions provided by the 
tool kit. 
Here we implemented about one hundred simulation action components which can be used to 
give behaviors to people including leaders and followers, anchor points, belief nodes, links, 
homes, temples and any other entities relevant to a religious practice. We co-developed this 
tool kit along with the model of the Kivung and their splinter group as described above. The 
tool kit includes action components we developed to support the visualization of the state of 
the model and the semantic network of the simulated agents. Other components are used to 
make observations of the simulation e.g. to plot the mean motivational level of religious 
participants. The models we implemented within this tool kit are a small semantic network 
for the Kivung religion consisting of 18 nodes and a splinter group consisting of 26 nodes.  
Modeling the Kivung required beginning with a series of assumptions about the memorability 
and motivational force of various nodes in the mainstream network. A starting assumption is 
that the more distant a given belief or practice is from an intuitive anchor point, the more 
rapidly it will be forgotten or garbled if not encountered regularly. We also assume that 
different nodes in the network have variable motivational force or emotional salience, ranging 
from low (e.g. the Kivung dogma of original sin) to high (the expectation of returning 
ancestors or the fear of eternal damnation). We assume further that the frequency of exposure 
to a given node in the network will impact both memory and motivation: as frequency 
increases the risk of forgetting is reduced but so too is emotional salience; as frequency 
decreases, garbling and forgetting become more likely but emotional intensity is enhanced. 
Motivation is maximal when a belief is first acquired or refreshed. Motivation drops with 
time and with repetition. When mean motivational levels drop below a threshold, agents will 
be open to novel ideas.  
Our models of Kivung followers currently include two kinds of agents with artificial minds: 
expert orators and lay adherents. Orators are ascribed the semantic network portrayed in 
Figure 1. They transmit the contents of this network to the laity in accordance with standard 
Kivung schedules e.g. following a five-week cycle of twice-weekly speeches about the ten 
laws. Followers update their semantic networks based on what the orators tell them. Agents 
forget nodes in the network that are not repeated frequently and the rate of forgetting is partly 
determined by the distance of a given node from an intuitive anchor point – the further away 
from an anchor point, the more easily the node decays. Each node has a maximum level of 
motivation, represented in the visualization tools and the figures below by a color. Colors 
towards the red end of the spectrum represent high motivation; those towards the blue end 
low motivation. Levels of motivation diminish over time and with repetition.
2
 When 
motivation levels drop below a threshold, tedium sets in, the orthodoxy loses its authority, 
and more appealing innovations begin to enjoy a selective advantage. Figure 3 is a snapshot 
taken from one of our simulations of the semantic network of a typical member of the Kivung 
splinter group around the mid-point of its existence. 
                                                 
2
  We assume that a religious practice (such as gospel singing), just like any cultural practice (such as 
going to a rock concert) is always higher impact when first experienced than after many years of having similar 
experiences. 
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Figure 3: Snapshot of semantic network for typical Kivung splinter group member 
Our model executes by simulating the individuals in the population. Some are religious 
leaders and regularly transmit parts of the doctrine. Others when receiving those 
transmissions add nodes (practices and beliefs), add links between nodes, and strengthen 
existing links. Nodes and links in each individual’s semantic network have some probability 
of being forgotten. The motivational levels of the population are derived from the properties 
of the nodes representing practices and beliefs. These levels decay with repetition.  
Followers in the model are periodically exposed to novel religious ideas. As long as most 
agents are regularly exposed to mainstream orthodoxy they notice unauthorized innovations, 
and as long as motivation levels are sufficiently high they will reject these ideas as erroneous 
or heretical. Once motivational levels have dropped to the threshold of the tedium effect 
(noted above) followers become open to adopting mutant beliefs and practices. Thus, in the 
case of the splinter group described earlier, we can simulate the process by which agents 
came to accept the possession of Tanotka, the veracity of reports from the temples, the need 
for ring rituals, the mass marriage, and so on. This general pattern is captured in Figure 4 
which depicts changes in motivation levels over time. We observe a steady decline of 
motivational level as the mainstream doctrine is frequently repeated until levels become low 
enough for followers to begin to accept novel beliefs necessary for splinter-group formation. 
Under the influence of the new nodes, the motivation level increases although older nodes 
contribute less to motivational levels due to repetition.  
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Figure 4: Dynamics of mean motivational level for the population plotted against time 
 
While we believe there is much to learn from this coarse modeling of the Kivung, the tool kit 
we used to implement these models can accommodate much larger and more detailed 
networks. The tool kit supporting the model will be extended so that we can model 
transmissions and motivational changes caused by followers interacting with kin, in-laws, 
neighbors, and others. We have begun extending the tool kit to model multiple villages and a 
hierarchy of leadership. Several behaviors could be added to enable the modeling of long-
term dynamics including birth, death, migration, and interactions between generations.  As 
we extend and enhance the construction kit models can be constructed to explore new issues. 
Potentially, these might include group cohesion, the creation and role of social networks, 
nested groups within wider organization and different levels of jurisdictional hierarchy, 
competition between groups, and multi-generational dynamics. The Kivung is our first case 
study, a means of establishing ‘proof of concept’. Nevertheless, the tool kit presented here 
would only need a few additional components to be capable of modelling a wide range of 
substantially different religious traditions from around the world. 
Model 2: Expanding the explanatory reach of the DMR theory through simulations 
  
Model 1 was designed to explore the mechanisms by which intuitive, mnemonic, and 
motivational constraints impact the reproduction and transformation of religious systems. 
Viewed in an evolutionary framework, these are problems of proximate causation. But modes 
of religiosity are also adaptations to varying ecological conditions, often including 
competition with other cultural groups for scarce resources. To explain how and why modes 
of religiosity emerge and spread is thus also a question of ultimate causation.  
 
Population and evolutionary processes can be modeled in a variety of ways. The level of 
detail for a model and the values estimated for its parameters depend on both our level of 
knowledge about the target system we are trying to understand and also our objectives in 
describing the system. In the models reported here we take a joint population dynamic / 
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cultural evolution approach by modeling religious groups as units that can change in 
membership and in behaviors. Depending on our objectives, we could investigate short- or 
long-term dynamics, the birth, evolution and extinction of groups, or we could model 
behavioral trait evolution.  
 
Model 2 is based on hypothesized patterns of recruitment and defection in a pluralistic 
religious environment comprising traditions operating in the doctrinal mode, where 
opportunities to move between traditions are motivated by incentives or ‘carrots’ or impeded 
by sanctions or ‘sticks’. If we imagine, for instance, a bustling American city with numerous 
Christian churches vying for members, then it seems reasonable to assume that euphoric 
practices such as gospel singing, speaking in tongues, miraculous healings, and so on will be 
highly visible to potential recruits. Such practices in our model function as ‘carrots’, enticing 
potential converts as well as maintaining high motivation levels among existing members. 
But traditions also commonly impose sanctions on defection, ranging from the withdrawal of 
social support networks through to the threat of terrible forms of supernatural punishment 
such as eternal damnation. These sanctions or ‘sticks’ serve to reduce the rate at which 
members of a tradition defect, even when incentives to do so are present.  
 
The survival of a religious tradition depends not only on its capacity to attract and maintain a 
following but also by its capacity to achieve cultural stability over time. Beliefs and practices 
that are frequently and publicly repeated, for instance daily or weekly, come to be somewhat 
fixed in procedural and semantic memory and widely shared in the participating population 
(Whitehouse 1992). When the frequency of participation is reduced, however, innovations are 
less readily noted (Whitehouse 2004) and there is a tendency to favor innovations that are 
pleasing (thereby functioning as ‘carrots’). In this way a doctrinal orthodoxy can be 
reconfigured as (or augmented by) more popular expressions of religiosity, such as local 
festivals, cults, and related customs, typically occurring less frequently than the mainstream 
tradition (e.g. according to seasonal or annual cycles). Where a doctrinal orthodoxy is 
substantially displaced by more colorful ‘little traditions’ (Redfield 1955), the stage is set for 
reformations (Whitehouse 2000; cf. Weber 1947). Typically reforming ambitions seek to 
restore the basics or ‘fundamentals’ of the original doctrinal orthodoxy and the more 
routinized forms of worship needed to reproduce these elements (Pyssiainen 2005). By 
contrast, when the frequency of worship increases, even the most euphoric practices 
gradually lose their charm. Excessive routinization of a tradition can produce the ‘tedium 
effect’ (see above), a state of affairs in which openness to major innovations, and thus 
splintering from the mainstream tradition, becomes increasingly likely. In some cases splinter 
groups return to the fold, their motivation levels rejuvenated (as in the Kivung case study 
described above). Such a scenario is especially common where the goals of the splinter group 
are unachievable, as in most ‘activist’ religions such as millenarian movements and cargo 
cults (Worsley 1957). Other splinter groups, however, may present teachings and prophesies 
capable of sustaining their credibility indefinitely and so can form more or less stable buds, 
offshoots from the mainstream religion that in some cases spread widely, even displacing the 
more ancient tradition. Our present question is whether the same patterns would emerge from 
a computational simulation based on quite parsimonious assumptions. 
 
Model 2, although conceptually simple, requires a surprising number of rules to achieve even 
this essential level of realism. The model is simulated numerically through an iterative 
process (c.f. details in this article’s electronic appendix). The model can follow any specified 
number of religious groups from year to year, and deploys a set of rules governing practices, 
ritual frequencies, splintering and reformation, and between-group migration. In practices, 
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depending on ritual frequency, groups change in their ability to attract new followers or 
maintain existing followers. For low frequencies, groups tend to become more attractive to 
outsiders, whereas for high ritual frequencies, they tend to maintain their population through 
fear. In frequencies, a group may increase or decrease its ritual frequency, based on recent 
tendencies to become more repressive towards existing members (in which case ritual 
frequencies increase), no net change in practices (ritual frequency is lowered), or more 
attractive to outsiders (no change occurs in frequency). Splintering events and reformations 
may occur, when groups become polarized in their practices. For groups that can no longer 
attract outsiders, there is a chance that the group splinters, in which case its ritual frequency 
decreases and it becomes more directed at attracting new members from the outside. In 
contrast, a group that is no longer able to maintain its following may experience a 
reformation, in which case it increases its ritual frequency and adopts techniques to increase 
group cohesion. Finally, individuals may migrate from group to group, and tend to do so 
when other groups are more attractive than their own, and their own group has weak cohesion 
mechanisms.  
 
To examine the typical behavior of our model and to illustrate possibilities for future 
development and research, we conducted a number of numerical experiments.  We present 
two of these briefly here (for details of the experiments and additional results please see the 
electronic appendix). In the first, we let a single religious group evolve to see how it may or 
may not change in isolation. In the second, we introduced 10 identical religious groups into 
the system, and explored how their characteristics changed through time.  
 
Figure 5 shows the case where a single religious group evolves in isolation. We see that 
rituals alternate between periods of high and low frequency, that the transients at low 
frequency tend to last longer than those at high, and that intermediate frequencies are also 
very transient (Figure 5 (i)). A characteristic feature of this group is that repressive practices 
tend to exceed those capable of attracting new recruits (Figure 5 (ii)), and peaks in 
repressiveness tend to correlate with high ritual frequency. Given the condition that 
repression/ attraction capacities must go to very low frequencies in order for a splintering/ 
reformation to occur, Figure 5 shows that splintering is fairly frequent (about every 200 
simulated years), whereas reformation is never observed. Figure 6 starts with the same 
conditions as the experiment in Figure 5, except that 10 identical groups are initially present. 
We see that many groups rapidly go extinct, due to competition for group members. Only two 
groups remain after 800 simulated years. Note that the prevailing groups possessed high 
ratios of attractiveness to repressiveness at the beginning of the simulation (Figure 6 (iii)), 
and were thus able to recruit members of competing groups. After year 800, the two 
persisting groups cycle in apposition to one another (Figure 6 (i)) and show cycles in ritual 
frequency (Figure 6 (ii)) and repression to attraction ratios (Figure 6 (iii)) that are similar to 
those for the single group in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Dynamics of (i) ritual frequency and (ii) relative ability to attract outsiders 
compared to repress insiders in a single group over 1000 years of simulation 
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Figure 6: Competition between 10 religious groups over 2000 simulated years 
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The goal of the competition model is to increase our understanding of long-term changes in 
religious group behaviors. We need to identify the main processes that influence behaviors 
and how these impact the relative success or failure of groups. As shown in the simulations, 
these changes may be rapid, and seemingly doomed groups may rebound and come to 
dominate what once were successful groups.  
 
It is important to note that this is a highly abstract, descriptive, exploratory model. The 
parameters described as constants in the outline of the algorithm and held constant in the 
simulations could all be altered. Doing this systematically and observing the results is called 
sensitivity analysis, which is an important part of model development. A comprehensive 
sensitivity analysis will both highlight the model parameters that require accurate estimation 
and also identify those that are pivotal to explaining variance in religious group behavior.  
 
The flexibility of the algorithm allows for many possible lines of investigation, including the 
origin of successful religious groups, their characteristics, and how changing social 
landscapes may affect the persistence of endangered groups. To achieve greater rigor, 
however, several notable modifications to the current model will be necessary. First, changes 
in ritual procedures and frequencies will need to be integrated into a framework that allows 
for emulation of surrounding, more successful groups. Second, the model will need to be 
spatial, such that groups in proximity to one another interact more often than those that are 
more distant. A spatially explicit model must also address the question of religious spread: is 
it via local transmission or long distance colonization? Third, the theory will need to be 
modified to include more demographic variables, including different birth rates resulting 
from varied religious doctrines and practices. And fourth, future models should include 
defining cultural markers, allowing us to assess how the cultural landscape changes under 
variable competitive scenarios. 
Discussion:  Recalibrating the DMR theory 
The process of building a simulation leads to theory refinement, an absolutely critical aspect 
of science. Establishing a plausible, coherent explanation for the phenomena we see around 
us is after all the primary goal of scientific research. Where there has been no previous theory 
or the previous theory was unnecessarily complex, then the simple demonstration that a 
model could possibly serve as an explanation is already a major contribution. Detailed 
validation against data is a way to improve existing theories, or to determine which of two 
variant theories is better at predicting and explaining the world. But establishing in the first 
place that an explanation could account for the data on a qualitative level is not only a 
contribution, it is a necessary first step before the iterative improvement of a theory can take 
place. 
For the DMR theory in particular, many of its predictions are motivated by postulated causal 
links between ritual frequency, emotional arousal, memory, intuitive ontology, codification, 
transmission, group cohesion, group structure and scale, and social identity. In attempting to 
model this theory, the precise nature of these causal links has had to be specified more closely 
than ever before.  As a result we have produced a raft of new hypotheses warranting further 
empirical investigation. Thus we demonstrate a significant benefit of modeling – that it 
enables us to expand and refine our repertoire of research questions. Here we detail just five 
examples. 
 
 16 
First, building models has led to more fine-grained predictions concerning the effects of ritual 
frequency and systemic rigidity. In earlier formulations, the DMR theory proposed that high-
frequency (‘routinized’) rituals and associated doctrinal transmission would serve to rigidify 
both orthodoxy and orthopraxy by making unintended innovation more discernible (and 
therefore more readily sanctioned) than in lower-frequency traditions. As frequency drops, so 
the potential for alterations to the system of beliefs and practices to occur undetected would 
increase. Our simulation of Kivung dynamics in Model 1 entailed the construction of an 
explicit network of concepts and practices for a particular high-frequency religious tradition, 
represented as nodes in changing semantic networks. This demonstrated the need for more 
precise specification of nodes, revealing also that some of the nodes are publicly transmitted 
more frequently than others. Rather than aggregating the effects of frequency on religious 
systems as a whole, we were forced to recognize that some sectors of the system will be 
subject to decay (due to forgetting or garbling) more rapidly than other sectors, thereby 
helping to explain patterns of change in religious systems at a more detailed level.
3
 For the 
purposes of modeling changes we needed to specify those rates of change and their 
consequences explicitly. 
 
Second, modeling the DMR theory has revealed hidden complexities in the relationship 
between frequency and intuitiveness. It has long been appreciated that processes of decay 
(garbling and forgetting) in doctrinal systems are non-random, being skewed towards more 
intuitive versions of the orthodoxy. Crudely describable as “dumbing down” the more 
technical term for this process is the ‘cognitive optimum effect’ (Whitehouse 2004). Until 
building our Kivung simulation, however, nobody had considered how the relative proximity 
of nodes in a network to intuitive beliefs might affect rates of decay as frequency drops. 
Building Model 1 made us realize that nodes more distantly connected to intuitive anchor 
points would inevitably decay faster than those with a more immediate intuitive grounding, 
so further refining our predictions with regard to the transformation of religious systems. 
 
Third, our models have produced new insights into the relationship between frequency, 
arousal, and motivation. It has long been observed that the more frequently a node is 
encountered the lower its emotional impact and motivating force are likely to be, all else 
being equal. Consequently religious traditions requiring the most frequent levels of 
participation will be vulnerable to the ‘tedium effect’ (Whitehouse 2004). Specifying the 
effects of frequency on the emotionality of beliefs and practices in the Kivung prompted an 
appreciation that the rate of decay in the affective and motivational qualities of nodes in the 
meaning system will be moderated by intrinsic content of the nodes themselves, leading to a 
more nuanced and explicit set of predictions regarding the processes by which demoralization 
and the tedium effect come about. Similar insights resulted from the development of Model 2, 
particularly with regard to the emotional and motivational characteristics of beliefs and 
practices. 
 
Fourth, our efforts to model imagistic splintering revealed that not all religious innovations 
are created equal. Earlier formulations of the DMR theory proposed that low-frequency, high-
arousal rituals would be most likely to arise in a doctrinal tradition as a consequence of the 
tedium effect. Although the process of splintering typically involves the stepwise introduction 
of novel nodes to a semantic network, little thought had previously been given to the effects 
of sequencing in the appearance of novel beliefs and practices on emotional and motivational 
                                                 
3
  Kirby (1999) shows similarly how selection on a culture for expressivity can result in artificial 
languages that show characteristics previously thought to be a consequence of innate, uniquely human cognitive 
capacities (Chomsky 1965). 
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states, both during the lifetime of a splinter group and following its collapse. Simulating the 
process of splintering in the Kivung required explicit consideration of the effects of 
sequencing, as nodes in the network would lose emotional salience and motivational force 
through repetition whereas late-appearing nodes would do so to a lesser extent. Exploring 
these previously neglected aspects of doctrinal-imagistic oscillations also forced us to 
consider more explicitly how the collapse of splinter groups impacts emotion and motivation 
in the mainstream tradition in which they occur. These insights also played an important role 
in building Model 2.  
 
Fifth, our models generated novel insights into the nature of between-group competition 
among doctrinal traditions. While efforts to test the DMR theory have provided valuable 
insights into patterns of transformation within individual doctrinal traditions over time, less 
effort has been directed to the question of competition for members among rival traditions. In 
an environment where opportunities to convert to rival traditions are very limited emotional 
appeal and sanctions for defection can be quite limited. But when multiple groups compete 
for members, their survival (measured by numerical strength of membership) will be affected 
by the capacity of individual groups to attract non-members and to retain those already 
committed. The construction of Model 2 generated a raft of specific predictions concerning 
the relative pulling power and retention capacities of doctrinal traditions, prompting 
unforeseen questions about the evolution of religious systems.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We have shown that the interdisciplinary exercise of social simulation in general and of 
modeling religious change in particular can provide many benefits.  We have demonstrated 
here how simulation illuminates and extends a theory while at the same time testing its 
plausibility and providing new predictions to be tested against empirical data. We have 
described two very different sorts of models. First, we modeled a particular documented case 
of religious change: the formation of a splinter group from the Kivung movement. This 
enabled us to explore the proximate causes of various features of splinter group formation 
and collapse. Note that this model did not miraculously replicate the exact course of historic 
events.  Rather we programmed in the sorts of changes in belief and ritual observed, and then 
used this model to determine which parameter sets could account for agents shifting between 
networks of beliefs and practices, and which could not. Second, we described a model of 
competing doctrinal religions. This was far more abstract model developed from a population 
perspective. Here rather than directing the results toward a particular outcome, we explored 
the consequences of the theorized dynamics underlying the DMR. Again we find the 
outcomes surprising and indicative of additional research that needs to be carried out. Perhaps 
systems similar to those we observe in our model do exist in human societies but were 
previously unobserved or unrecognized for what they are, or perhaps our model and the 
theories it embodies need further development.  Only data derived from observing real 
religions can tell us this. 
 
Our overarching goal has been to demonstrate the utility of simulations for exploring and 
refining the coherence and plausibility of existing theory in the social science even prior to 
quantitative validation against empirical data.  The work described here may be seen as work 
in progress, in that we still hope (and indeed plan) to take the new predictions forward by 
gathering more complete field data to test the validity of these models. But contributions have 
already been made here in terms of better specifying the theory itself, and of showing the 
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theory’s consequences, as we outlined in the Discussion. The process of theory construction 
and communication is in itself an academic contribution.   
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